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Behind the Curtain: Understanding the Real Stakes in the Bank of Khyber Disciplinary Saga

Peshawar High Court’s recent decision to stay disciplinary proceedings against two senior officers of the Bank of Khyber has sparked considerable attention across legal, financial, and political circles. While the petitioners position themselves as victims of institutional overreach, a deeper examination reveals a more troubling pattern—one that goes beyond this single case and speaks to the larger malaise afflicting public sector institutions.

According to publicly available details, the disciplinary action stems from the Eclipse Resort Living and Mall financing default. Petitioners claim that the internal process was flawed and that the matter had already been addressed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). However, it’s important to recognize that NAB’s closure of an inquiry does not amount to exoneration—especially when that closure is based on jurisdictional limits or deference to institutional mechanisms. Financial institutions like BoK have every right—and responsibility—to carry out internal reviews under their own service rules.

What’s notably absent from the public debate is the historical pattern of disruption and institutional paralysis linked to certain long-standing officers. Over the years, the Bank of Khyber has witnessed repeated MD-level resignations, each marked by internal rifts, bureaucratic infighting, and targeted undermining.

Several credible sources from within and outside the bank describe how a small clique has allegedly sustained its influence by strategically aligning with different factions of the board—often sowing division between public and private sector directors. Certain individuals have historically played a disruptive role by creating divisions between public and private sector directors, often positioning themselves as intermediaries and reinforcing their influence by amplifying perceived loyalties. Such behavior has led to toxic work environments and an erosion of trust at the highest levels of decision-making.

This strategy has worked remarkably well, particularly because such mafias often find aggressive protection from certain directors, to the extent that accountability becomes an illusion. The alliance is so entrenched that for some directors, these individuals can seemingly do no wrong. Their actions—regardless of the alleged harm caused to the institution—are rationalized, deflected, or simply ignored. This immunity emboldens misconduct and ensures that institutional reform remains a slogan rather than a standard.

What makes the current case even more telling is the unusual desperation with which the parties in question are trying to halt the inquiry itself. In most disciplinary scenarios, respondents wait to challenge the final outcome if they believe they’ve been wronged. Here, however, there’s an active attempt to stop the process before any conclusion is reached. That in itself raises red flags. It suggests not just a fear of exposure, but a mindset that sees the bank as owing them protection—rather than the other way around.

Observers argue that this is not just a matter of administrative procedure, but a test of institutional will. If even an internal inquiry can’t be carried out without judicial intervention and media drama, what does that say about the state of corporate governance in public financial institutions?

At its core, this case isn’t just about two individuals or one bad loan. It is about whether public institutions—especially those backed by taxpayer funds—can stand up to internal capture by long-serving power players who believe they are untouchable. For the Bank of Khyber, the outcome will have long-term implications: either paving the way for accountability and reform, or cementing the power of those who have long operated above scrutiny.

Time will reveal whether this is a moment of reckoning—or just another missed opportunity to send the right message that no one is above accountability.


  • Sher muhammad mehmand and his close group of ‘chamchas’ hz destroyed the bank. Many loyal employees have resigned due to him and hz group. He even forced MD of the bank to resign few years back

  • Pakistan ka dab se bakwas bank . iska staff b bakwad hai. Help line per 20,25 mint tak intexar krna parega jab koi issue ajaye apko help line se rabta krne main 30 mint se ziada waqt lagega….. Koi b is bank main.account na kole werna pachtawoge

  • It is tragic how on the one hand provincial and federal governments, having been proven incapable of running businesses, are forced to privatise them and on the other, they keep setting up new ones. It is not the business of the state to run banks. Yet, we have mediocre people running mediocre banks like BoP, BoK, Sindh Bank, AJK Bank. The Presidents of two of these have a checkered past having been made to resign by previous employers for financial dishonesty and the President of another, a miracle man, is a lying, cheating publicity machine who excels only in window dressing.

  • Sher Mohammad Mohmand does not know banking. Ihsanullah Ihsan does not know risk management. An enquiry needs to be held into how two very incompetent individuals came to occupy such high positions in the bank. Sher has been undermining every MD that he has worked for. Nothing will happen with regard to the Eclipse enquiry because the beneficiaries of Eclipse are occupying high positions even today – one in the provincial bureaucracy and the other as a PTI traitor. A bank with a governance structure where a grade 19/20 officer is Chairman and another grade 19 officer is a board member and a Memon from Karachi, with 25% shares, in connivance with people like Sher and Ihsan hijacks the bank and runs it like his personal casino is bound to be the mess that BoK is today.SBP is compromised as usual because the FPT of Hasan Raza should never have been cleared. He was made to resign from HBL due to dishonesty. And, from Habib Metro when they Informally learnt about his past at HBL from senior insiders. The whole industry knows about Hasan Raza (he and Atif Bokhari were also responsible for the Lake City disaster loan) and as Head of Structured Credits and Remedial, he took money from many defaulters, especially in Faisalabad where his front man was his younger brother (also at HBL at the time).


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